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Behavioral choices that ignore prior experience
promote exploration and unpredictability but are
seemingly at odds with the brain’s tendency to use
experience to optimize behavioral choice. Indeed,
when faced with virtual competitors, primates resort
to strategic counterprediction rather than to stochas-
tic choice. Here, we show that rats also use history-
and model-based strategies when faced with similar
competitors but can switch to a ‘‘stochastic’’ mode
when challenged with a competitor that they cannot
defeat by counterprediction. In this mode, outcomes
associated with an animal’s actions are ignored, and
normal engagement of anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC) is suppressed. Using circuit perturbations
in transgenic rats, we demonstrate that switching
between strategic and stochastic behavioral modes
is controlled by locus coeruleus input into ACC.
Our findings suggest that, under conditions of
uncertainty about environmental rules, changes in
noradrenergic input alter ACC output and prevent
erroneous beliefs from guiding decisions, thus
enabling behavioral variation.
INTRODUCTION
When an animal repeatedly encounters the same situation, its
behavioral choices often vary, even when the optimal choice
should be clear from past experience. The fact that an identical
state of the environment can elicit different behavioral responses
is often interpreted as evidence that variability in behavior is the
unintended by-product of errors in decision making (Beck et al.,
2012; Faisal et al., 2008; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Padoa-
Schioppa, 2013). Butwhenuncertainty about environmental con-
ditions favors exploration, animals may benefit from intentionally
imposing variability on behavioral choices (Cohen et al., 2007;
O¨lveczky et al., 2005; Page and Neuringer, 1985; Sutton and
Barto, 1998). One potential strategy for generating variability in-
volves dispensing with prior beliefs, for example, by opting for a
purely stochastic mode of action selection. Implementing sucha strategy poses, however, a significant challenge in that the
brain has to ignore widespread signals that normally encode
past experience and rules of behavior derived from it (Buschman
et al., 2012; Vickery et al., 2011).How thenmight thebrain’s ability
to ignore past experience be exposed? A strategy of imposed
variability might be favored in situations in which prediction of
one’s actions by a competitor or predator has adverse conse-
quences (Nash, 1950; Maynard Smith and Harper, 1988)—a
concept that can be captured experimentally by confronting the
subject with an electronic competitor that strives to predict future
choiceon thebasis of past behavior, rewardingonlywhenpredic-
tion is eluded (Abe and Lee, 2011; Barraclough et al., 2004; Dorris
and Glimcher, 2004; Lee et al., 2004, 2005). Nevertheless, con-
struction of an internal mental model that effectively discerns
the workings of a competitor could generate a successful coun-
terpredictive strategy—a mental simulation of which prediction
the competitor is likely tomake—without the need for stochastic-
ity. Indeed, studies in primates support the idea that competition
triggers model-based counterprediction rather than stochastic
choice (Abe and Lee, 2011; Zhu et al., 2012).
As such, it remains unclear whether the brain possesses the
ability to implement stochastic action choice, rather than to
rely exclusively on experience-derived models of the environ-
ment. Studies in which task rules change suddenly have
provided clues that internal models can be overridden. In such
settings, animals respond to rule changes by abruptly initiating
exploratory behavior (Daw et al., 2006; Karlsson et al., 2012;
Nassar et al., 2010; O’Reilly et al., 2013), implying the existence
of a mechanism that can release behavioral control from the in-
fluence of an internal model that has been deemed inadequate.
The construction of internal models, notably also in competitive
settings, is thought to recruit neural activity in the anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC), among other brain regions (Hayden et al.,
2011; Holroyd and Yeung, 2012; Karlsson et al., 2012; Matsu-
moto et al., 2003; Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011; Yoshida and
Ishii, 2006; Zhu et al., 2012). This fits with the observation
of widespread and coordinated changes in the activity of the
neuronal population in the ACC concurrent with the decision to
abandon an inadequate model and initiate exploration (Karlsson
et al., 2012). It is thought that activation of the noradrenergic
system signals the decision to abandon an inadequate model,
driven presumably by unexpected mismatches between the in-
ternal model’s predictions and environmental feedback (JepmaCell 159, 21–32, September 25, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 21
AC D E F
B Figure 1. Rats’ Behavior in a Virtual
Competitive Environment
(A) Concept of the behavioral task. After initiating a
trial at the central port, an animal is eligible to
receive a reward only if his choice of the reward
port differs from that predicted by the computer
competitor. The three holes in the wall represent
the initiation port (center) and both choice ports
(left and right).
(B) Two example sequences of left (L) and right (R)
choices from rats who face no competitive pres-
sure when the computer chooses the reward port
randomly and competitor 1, top and bottom,
respectively, together with outcome (reward,
indicated by the droplet, or no reward). Horizontal
curly brackets indicate common patterns.
(C) Real reward (solid bars) in actual play and
fictive reward (striped bars) in simulated play.
(D) First-session mean reward rates against the
various competitors. The dashed line indicates
the reward rate that rats would receive if their
choices were generated by an unbiased stochas-
tic process.
(E) Mean Kullbach-Leibler (K-L) divergence of the rats’ behavior against the various competitors from optimal (see Experimental Procedures).
(F) MeanShannon entropy of choice patterns against the various competitors. The significance of the difference between competitor 2 (gray line) and competitor 3
(blue line) is indicated by an asterisk. (C–F) n = 12 against competitor 1, n = 13 against competitor 2, and n = 12 against competitor 3. *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001,
Wilcoxon rank sum. Error bars represent the SEM.
See also Figure S1.and Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Nassar et al., 2012; Payzan-LeNestour
et al., 2013; Yu and Dayan, 2005), raising the possibility that
modulation of ACC’s model-encoding circuits by the input
from the noradrenergic system underlies the release of behavior
from the control of an internal model.
Here, we probe whether a stochastic strategy is adopted when
behavioral choice is released from the influence of an internal
model in complex settings, and whether the noradrenergic sys-
tem plays a role in this behavioral switch, by taking advantage
of regimes of sustained behavioral variability induced by compet-
itivesettings.Usingavirtual competitive task,we testwhether rats
are still capable of generating variable behavioral choices when
faced with a competitor that is sophisticated enough to thwart
the animal’s modeling attempts. We find that when faced with a
competitor that they cannot defeat by counterprediction, animals
switch to a distinct mode of action selection consistent with sto-
chastic choice. In this mode, characterized by highly variable
choice sequences, behavior becomes dramatically less depen-
dent on the history of outcomes associated with different actions
and becomes independent from the ACC. Moreover, selective
enhancement or suppression of locus coeruleus input into the
ACC, respectively, abolishes or restores model-based control of
behavior and, with it, sensitivity to environmental feedback. Our
findings argue that neural mechanisms for purposeful behavioral
variability do exist and strongly suggest that noradrenergic action
in ACCcontrols the extent towhichbehavioral choices areguided
by the internal model or stochastic selection.
RESULTS
To explore whether stochastic choice can be exposed in a
competitive setting, we trained rats on a task that required22 Cell 159, 21–32, September 25, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.them to select one of two reward ports while being monitored
by a computer-simulated (virtual) competitor (Figure 1A). The
computer was programmed to search the history of animal
performance for behavioral patterns that could be used to
predict its upcoming choice. In this scheme, the animal is
eligible to receive a reward at the chosen port only if its choice
differs from that predicted by the computer. We first deter-
mined whether rats, like primates, use a counterpredictive strat-
egy when they encounter a weak competitor. Specifically, we
exposed rats to a virtual competitor that counteracts an animal’s
bias for selecting one of the two ports following a particular im-
mediate history of choices and reward but only when this bias
exceeds a preset threshold (see the Experimental Procedures).
Against this competitor (competitor 1, similar to the one used
in previous primate studies [Barraclough et al., 2004; Lee et al.,
2004]), rats were able to make their choices sufficiently variable
to sustain a relatively high average reward rate (41.6% ± 1.4%;
Figure 1D), which rose further during subsequent sessions,
sometimes surpassing (see below) the 50% expected for an un-
biased stochastic strategy. Nevertheless, each rat’s behavior
still contained clearly detectable structure (see Figure 1B for a
representative example; Figure S1A available online). This might
simply reflect the animals’ natural preference for simple patterns,
something that is not completely suppressed by the competi-
tive pressure applied by competitor 1, or indicate the use of
counterprediction.
To distinguish between these two possibilities, we relied on
the fact that an effective counterprediction strategy can actually
lead to a reward rate that exceeds that for stochastic choice
(50%). In fact, for some animals playing against competitor 1,
we observed reward rates significantly higher than would be ex-
pected by chance deviations from 50%, reaching as high as 60%
(p < 0.001 after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons;
bootstrap from a binomial process against competitor 1). Thus,
these animals were eventually able to model aspects of the
underlying prediction algorithm and used that knowledge for
counterprediction. A more sophisticated opponent is therefore
necessary to thwart attempts at model construction.
More Sophisticated Electronic Competitors
To render feedback- and model-based strategies ineffective, we
designed two more challenging competitors (2 and 3). Compet-
itor 2 uses the same prediction algorithm as competitor 1, except
it removes the requirement for the bias in favor of one side over
the other to reach a predetermined threshold before competitive
pressure is applied (see the Experimental Procedures). Compet-
itor 3 uses a sophisticated machine-learning method, known as
boosting (Friedman et al., 2000, see the Experimental Proce-
dures), an algorithm of much greater complexity that learns to
generate a strong prediction on the basis of a set of weak trends
in the data.
We used simulated play to test whether the algorithms of com-
petitors 2 and 3 provided better prediction than did competitor 1
by calculating the reward accrued from using animals’ real
behavioral performance against one competitor as simulated
choices against another (see the Experimental Procedures). A
stronger competitor would detect some of the patterns that a
weaker competitor missed, leading to a correct prediction of
the choices made by the animal—and with that, to a withholding
of the reward—on more trials. The simulated reward against
competitors 2 and 3 (34.4% and 30.6%) indeed fell short of the
actual reward against competitor 1 (41.6%; Figure 1C; Wilcoxon
rank sum, p < 0.001 for competitors 2 versus 1 and 3 versus 1,
n = 12 animal histories; also see the Experimental Procedures).
Furthermore, competitor 3 beat competitor 2 in simulated play
(Figure 1C; 35.42% ± 1.24% simulated reward against compet-
itor 3 versus 42.95% ± 1.03% actual reward against competitor
2, p < 0.001 Wilcoxon rank sum, n = 13 animal histories). These
findings imply that competitors 2 and 3 can detect patterns left
unpunished by competitor 1 and will, therefore, exert stronger
competitive pressure requiring progressively more sophisticated
counterpredictive strategies in order to sustain a high rate of
reward. A stochastic strategy for producing variable behavioral
choices would, of course, be effective against any of the com-
petitors (1, 2, and 3).
Successful Performance against Stronger Competitors
Having established that competitors 2 and 3 exert stronger
competitive pressure, we next investigated whether rats are still
able to find successful strategies when actually playing against
them. Animals accrued comparable first-session reward rates
across all competitors (Figure 1D; not significant for competitor
1 versus competitor 2 or 3, Wilcoxon rank sum), suggesting
that they produced fewer detectable patterns as the competitive
pressure increased. We also tested the presence of patterns
directly by comparing the conditional probabilities of choosing
either the left or right reward port given a particular history
pattern and found that they became more balanced for all pat-
terns—a prerequisite for being optimally unpredictable (Fig-
ure 1E; p < 0.05 for Kullback-Leibler [K-L] divergence fromoptimal for competitors 2 versus 1, n = 12 animals; p < 0.05 for
competitors 3 versus 2, n = 13 animals, Wilcoxon rank sum;
see the Experimental Procedures). Furthermore, the animals’
patterns of sequential choices were more uniformly distributed
across the space of all possible patterns for greater competitive
strengths, even for longer patterns (Figure 1F; Wilcoxon rank
sum, p < 0.05 for entropy of choice sequences for competitors
2 versus 1 and competitors 3 versus 2 at pattern lengths 4, 5,
and 6; see the Experimental Procedures). The previously used
virtual competitor (competitor 1) thus did not reveal the brain’s
full capacity for generating behavioral variability.
Is the increase in behavioral-choice variability against compet-
itors 2 and 3 indicative of an increase in the sophistication
of counterprediction, or have such strategies been abandoned
and replaced by the active generation of behavioral variability
in a manner that is feedback- and model-independent? Multiple
linear regression of the rats’ choices on the choices and out-
comes of the preceding three trials suggested that the strategy
against competitor 2, but likely not against competitor 3, was still
dependent on feedback from the environment (Figure S1B). We,
therefore, set out to test directly whether the sophistication of
competitor 3 was enough to push the animals into a feedback-
and model-independent behavioral mode.
In designing an experimental approach to test whether the
animals’ choices depend on environmental feedback and
model-based counterprediction, we reasoned that any behav-
ioral mode that relies on feedback for generating variable
behavior should also make the animal sensitive to changes in
the statistics of the reward associated with different choice pat-
terns, enabling it to detect and exploit novel opportunities in the
environment. Furthermore, a behavioral strategy that involves
the mental simulation of the competitor’s prediction algorithm
would be dependent on computations that likely take place in
the ACC (Zhu et al., 2012). An effectively stochastic mode would,
on the other hand, make behavior insensitive to environmental
feedback and independent of model-related computations in
the ACC.
Adoption of a Strategy that Ignores Environmental
Feedback
We first assessed whether animals come to ignore the correla-
tion between behavioral patterns and environmental feedback
when faced with stronger competitive pressure. To test this,
we surreptitiously switched animals that had been playing
against competitors 2 or 3 to a specifically designed task that re-
quires an animal to discover that a particular (covert) pattern of
choices is always rewarded but do so in the presence of a paral-
lel reward stream that weakly encourages unpredictable rather
than structured behavior (Figure 2A; see the Experimental Proce-
dures). We chose one of two three-step patterns (left-left-right,
‘‘LLR’’ or right-right-left, ‘‘RRL,’’ neither of which occur during
simple alternation) and set the reward rates such that adhering
to that pattern would be significantly more beneficial than main-
taining highly variable behavior (Experimental Procedures). In
this ‘‘covert pattern’’ task, rats are rewarded in a fraction of trials
even if their choices do not conform to the covert pattern (16%
of trials if the animal’s behavior is fully random). Nevertheless,
animals that remain sensitive to the reward statistics associatedCell 159, 21–32, September 25, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 23
AB
C Figure 2. Competitor 3 Induces Insensitivity
to Feedback that Is Revealed by ‘‘Covert
Pattern’’ Task
(A) Boxed LLR indicates the sequence that
receives reward (droplet). The arrow points to
a reward received due to the background
competitor.
(B) Reward rates (top) and prevalences of LLRLLR
(two covert sequences in a row, bottom) in the
three probe sessions following the switch from
competitors 2 (gray, comp 2) and 3 (blue, comp 3)
to the covert sequence task. n = 8 animals for
competitor 2 group; n = 16 animals for competitor
3 group.
(C) Performance of Q-learners. Top: Q-learning
reinforcement learning algorithm (schematic).
Bottom: density plot across all parameter values
of Q-learners’ performance against Competitor
3 (comp 3) versus performance in the ‘‘covert
pattern’’ task. Hotter colors represent higher
density. Crosses indicate actual rat performance
in competitor 3 group for comparison. Light gray,
first LLR session after switch from the competitor
3 setting. Dark gray, second LLR session. Black,
third LLR session. Dashed ellipse highlights the
subspace that contains most of the rat data points
but is devoid of coverage by Q-learner perfor-
mance. **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001, Wilcoxon rank
sum. Error bars represent the SEM.with particular sequences of actions should eventually be able to
infer that biasing their behavioral choices to conform to the
covert pattern provides the greatest reward (with 33% being
the maximum achievable for a perfect concatenation of LLR’s
or RRL’s). In contrast, animals that switch to a feedback- and
model-independent strategy would be less likely to discover
this opportunity to increase the reward rate.
Rats that had beforehand been playing against competitor 2
substantially improved in their ability to procure reward in this
‘‘covert pattern’’ task over the course of the first three sessions.
Most animals in this group reached reward rates above 20% by
the third session (Figure 2B, top; Wilcoxon rank sum, p < 0.001
for session 1 versus 3), which was similar to the ‘‘expert’’ level
of performance on this task observed after over 15 sessions of
training (23.75% ± 1.39% in session 3 versus 24.18% ± 0.57%
for ‘‘expert’’ animals, Wilcoxon rank sum, not significant). The
accompanying increase in the frequency of concatenated covert
patterns in the rats’ choices (Figure 2B, bottom) argues that the
animals were indeed able to infer the underlying rule, rather than
to achieve greater reward by simply biasing a stochastic strategy
to select one port more frequently. In striking contrast, reward
rates for rats that had previously been playing against competitor
3 rose to only, on average, 14.5% in three sessions, not above
the rate for random behavior, implying that they did not discover
the covert sequence (Figure 2B; not significant for competitor 3
group in sessions 3 versus 1; p < 0.005 in sessions 2 and 3 for
competitors 2 versus 3, Wilcoxon rank sum). This was not due
to a lack of rewarded examples, because in the first session
these animals performed the covert sequence, presumably by
chance, and received reward with a frequency on par with that
of the animals pre-exposed to competitor 2 (frequency of ‘‘covert24 Cell 159, 21–32, September 25, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.patterns’’ 10.36% ± 1.53% for competitor 2 group, 7.33% ±
1.13% for competitor 3 group, Wilcoxon rank sum, not
significant).
In principle, the prolonged insensitivity to environmental feed-
back observed in the ‘‘covert pattern’’ task following exposure to
competitor 3 could result from a behavioral strategy that is feed-
back dependent but tests a range of possible patterns too broad
to discover the covert ‘‘LLR’’ sequence efficiently. To address
this possibility, we simulated our experimental framework with
the ‘‘animal’’ being represented by a deterministic reinforce-
ment learning algorithm belonging to the widely used class of
Q-learners (Sutton, 1990; Watkins and Dayan, 1992). The under-
lying algorithm estimates, through experience, the value of
choosing either the left or the right port given the immediate his-
tory pattern of a particular length (from n = 1 to 6 steps in the past
for the different Q-learners) and makes the choice that has
the higher estimated value (Figure 2C, top; Experimental Proce-
dures). The Q-learners were able to infer the covert pattern rule
and achieve high rates of reward (comparable to animals in
Competitor 2 group; Figure 2C, bottom) even when they needed
to estimate and track the value of a large number of states. This
indicates that the information given to animals was at least in
principle sufficient to constrain even a large hypothesis space
that they may be using to defeat competitor 3. Interestingly,
despite varying the number of patterns tested by the Q-learners
and exploring a large space of algorithm parameters (Experi-
mental Procedures), we were unable to find Q-learners that per-
formed as well against competitor 3 and as poorly on the ‘‘covert
pattern’’ task as the rats in competitor 3 group without removing
environmental feedback for the ‘‘covert pattern’’ task (Figure 2C,
bottom). In summary, experiments and modeling show that
A B C
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Figure 3. ‘‘Covert Pattern’’ Task Performance Is Dependent on ACC
(A) Injection of muscimol into ACC/mPFC (schematic).
(B) Concatenated and smoothed prevalence of LLR (blue line) and the reward rate (black line) during four consecutive sessions on different days (vertical lines
indicate session boundaries) with vehicle (arrows indicate injections times; light gray bands indicate 2 hr intervals) or muscimol (arrows indicate injection times;
dark gray bands indicate 2 hr intervals) injections.
(C) Mean reward rate for rats performing the covert sequence task during vehicle and muscimol application, respectively.
(D) Sequence of initiation port (center) and reward port (left or right) insertions with and without mPFC inactivation, top and bottom, respectively. Note that the
initiation-to-reward-port transition (top curly brackets) is preserved. Bottom square bracket indicates covert sequence.
(E) Prevalence of all eight possible three-choice patterns during vehicle (light gray) and muscimol (dark gray) injections for the example shown in (B).
(F) Mean prevalences of two consecutive covert sequences during the 2 hr periods following vehicle (light gray) and muscimol (dark gray) injection, respectively.
(C and F) n = 5 animals. **p < 0.01, Wilcoxon rank sum. Error bars represent the SEM.
See also Figures S2 and S3.animals lose their sensitivity to environmental feedback while
playing against the strongest competitor (3), but not when play-
ing against the intermediate competitor (2).
Suppression of ACC’s Influence
Prior work suggests that feedback-dependent strategies adop-
ted in competitive settings involve mental simulation of different
possible outcomes (Abe and Lee, 2011; Abe et al., 2011; Zhu
et al., 2012) and thus rely on an internal model that is thought
to be stored, at least in part, in the ACC (Holroyd and Yeung,
2012; Karlsson et al., 2012; Matsumoto et al., 2003; Ribas-
Fernandes et al., 2011; Yoshida and Ishii, 2006). To provide inde-
pendent support for the conclusion that animals adopt a distinct
behavioral mode against competitor 3 in which actions are not
selected on the basis of past experience, we therefore investi-
gated whether ACC still influences behavior during play against
this competitor.
We first verified that effective performance on the ‘‘covert
pattern’’ task does indeed rely on the ACC. We found that
following a bilateral injection of muscimol, an agonist of the
GABA-A inhibitory channel, into the broader area of medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC) (Figure 3A), the animals continued to make
choices for hundreds of trials but no longer performed the covert
sequence significantly above the value expected for a biased
coin. The reward rate fell from 25.1% to 16.7% (averaged acrossall animals; Figure 3C, p < 0.001 for reward rate between saline
and muscimol conditions, Wilcoxon rank sum, n = 8 animals).
When we excluded from consideration animals for which the
postmortem analysis showed that the injection was outside of
the part of mPFC that is thought to be homologous to the
ACC, the rate fell to 13% (example session in Figure 3B; Fig-
ure S2A). The observed decrease in reward rate following mus-
cimol administration was due to a dramatic redistribution of the
relative prevalence of higher order patterns in animals’ choices
(example for three-step patterns in Figure 3E; Figure 3F; p <
0.001 for ‘‘LLRLLR’’ between vehicle and muscimol conditions,
Wilcoxon rank sum). Such a redistribution of patterns is evidence
that following muscimol administration, past choices and out-
comes have a reduced impact on current choices, as supported
by Markov chain analysis (Figure S3; Experimental Procedures).
ACC inactivation appeared to specifically affect complex
sequencing rather than chaining of actions in general, because
the animals still performed the sequential entries into the initia-
tion and reward ports correctly (Figure 3D). Initiation port-reward
port sequencing could, however, be reliably disrupted by inject-
ing muscimol into the dorsomedial striatum instead of the ACC
(Figure S2B). All muscimol effects were completely reversible,
with performance returning to levels seen before the injection af-
ter approximately 2 hr, consistent with the duration of muscimol
inactivation commonly observed (Martin, 1991). Thus, the ACC isCell 159, 21–32, September 25, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 25
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Figure 4. ACC Is Disengaged during Play against Competitor 3
(A–C) Mean reward rates (top) and mean Kullback-Leibler divergence of the rats’ behavior, during play against Competitors 1–3 across 2 hr periods following
vehicle (light bars) and muscimol (dark bars) injection, respectively.
(D) Prevalence of left choices (blue line) and the reward rate (black line), during four consecutive sessions on different days. Arrows indicate injection times for
vehicle (light blue bands indicate 2 hr intervals) and muscimol (dark blue bands indicate 2 hr intervals).
(E) Frequencies of all eight possible three choice patterns during vehicle and muscimol injections for the example shown in (D). Example data are for the same
animal as in Figures 3C and 3F after four sessions of retraining against competitor 3.
(A) n = 5 animals, (B) n = 4 animals, and (C) n = 6 animals. *p < 0.05, Wilcoxon rank sum. Error bars represent the SEM.essential when strategic sequencing of actions is key to suc-
cessful performance.
Next, we determined whether the strategy adopted against
competitor 2 also depends on the ACC. When muscimol was
administered into ACC as animals played against competitor 2,
both the reward rate (Figure 4B, top, 44.48% ± 1.02% for saline
versus 47.56% ± 0.81% for muscimol, p < 0.02, Wilcoxon signed
rank, two tailed) and the behavioral variability (Figure 4B, bottom,
K-L divergence decreasing from 0.109 ± 0.002 to 0.066 ± 0.015
under muscimol, p < 0.04, Wilcoxon signed rank, two tailed)
increased significantly. The effect of ACC silencing was even
greater when animals played competitor 1, consistent with the
idea that the more structured behavior observed against this
weaker competitor was also the result of counterprediction (Fig-
ure 4A). The strategy adopted against less sophisticated compet-
itors thus requires ACC activity and presumably relies on compu-
tations that takeplace there, in linewithprimateandhumanstudies
(Abe and Lee, 2011; Barraclough et al., 2004; Zhu et al., 2012).
Does the strategy adopted against competitor 3 differ funda-
mentally from that used against less sophisticated virtual oppo-
nents? If it does, then the successful performance against
competitor 3 might no longer rely on computations in ACC and
thus might be unaffected by ACC inactivation. Indeed, neither
reward rate nor, importantly, behavioral variability were affected
when muscimol was administered while animals played against
competitor 3 (Figure 4C). To guard against the possibility that
the injection hadmissed ACC, we performed some of the pertur-
bation experiments in animals where the effectiveness of the in-
jection had already been established by its suppression of covert26 Cell 159, 21–32, September 25, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.sequence performance prior to retraining against competitor
3 and observed the same dissociation (examples in Figures 3B
and 3E; Figures 4D and 4E). Together with the dramatically
reduced sensitivity to environmental feedback, this lack of any
detectable effect of ACC inactivation when playing against the
sophisticated opponent, strongly suggests that in this setting
feedback- and model-dependent decision making is switched
off. Our observations argue that the animals initially attempt to
develop a more complex counterpredictive strategy as the
competitive pressure increases, suggesting that a switch away
from the ‘‘strategic’’ behavioral mode happens only when the
search for a useful model is exhausted and deemed inadequate
and thus when imposing variation on one’s behavioral choices in
a manner independent of prior beliefs and experience is most
computationally advantageous.
Manipulation of LC Input into ACC Switches Behavioral
Modes
Prior work has linked the discarding of an inadequate internal
model with the rise in the level of noradrenergic neuronal activity
(Jepma and Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Nassar et al., 2012), prompting
us to examine the possibility that action of the noradrenergic sys-
tem in ACC itself plays a key role in inducing the switch between
behavioral modes.We achieved selectivemanipulation of norad-
renergic terminals in ACC by targeting the expression of Chan-
nelrhodopsin 2 (ChR2) or DREADD receptors (Armbruster et al.,
2007) to the noradrenergic neurons in the locus coeruleus of
tyrosine hydroxylase-Cre (TH-Cre) transgenic rats (Witten et al.,
2011) (Figure 5A) and then locally delivering light or the DREADD
A B C D
Figure 5. Manipulations of Locus Coeruleus Input into ACC Cause Switching between Behavioral Mode
(A) Specificity of local viral targeting strategy for effector delivery in TH-Cre rats. Expression of DIO-tdtomato virus in LC (bottom), but not in VTA (top).
(B) Top: experimental approach to pharmocogenetic control of LC input into the ACC (schematic). Bottom: experimental schedule.
(C) Reward rates in the three probe sessions following the switch to the ‘‘covert pattern’’ task for wild-type competitor 2 group (comp 2, light gray; data as in
Figure 2B) and competitor 3 group (comp 3, light blue; data as in Figure 2B), as well as for CNO-treated LC-rM3D-DREADD animals pretrained against competitor
2 (dark gray, n = 5) or LC-hM4D-DREADD animals pretrained against competitor 3 (dark blue, n = 5 animals).
(D) Cumulative difference from the mean for the prevalence of ‘‘LLRLLR’’ concatenation for an example CNO session. The dashed line indicates the 95%
confidence bound for the expected deviation. The arrow indicates a significant change point. ns, not significant, **p < 0.01, Wilcoxon rank sum. Error bars
represent the SEM.
See also Figures S4, S5, and S6.agonist Clozapine-N-Oxide (CNO) bilaterally in the ACC (Figures
5B, 6A, and 6B, left).
We first determined whether enhancing the action of the
noradrenergic system in ACC triggers a switch away from the
feedback- andmodel-dependent mode of action selection. Spe-
cifically, we asked whether a strong input from LC into the ACC
would make competitor 2-exposed animals, which retained
their sensitivity to environmental feedback, now behave on the
‘‘covert pattern’’ task more like animals whose modeling has
been thwarted by the sophistication of competitor 3. To obtain
pharmacological control over the activity of noradrenergic termi-
nals, we relied on the rM3Ds DREADD receptor (Dong et al.,
2010), which couples to the Gs-PKA signaling pathway impli-
cated in facilitating neurotransmitter release (Maximov et al.,
2007; Trudeau et al., 1996). Local administration of CNO into
ACC of rM3Ds-expressing animals in the competitor 2 group
prevented any performance improvement over the course of
three learning sessions (Figure 5C), with reward rates that were
indistinguishable from those seen in animals that had faced
competitor 3 (9.30% ± 0.91%, 12.67% ± 1.53% in sessions
2 and 3 for rM3D competitor 2 group in the presence of CNO
versus 11.65% ± 1.37%, 14.51% ± 1.54% for wild-type (WT)
competitor 3 group, not significant, Wilcoxon rank sum). In strik-
ing contrast, when the learning experiment was later repeated
under a vehicle condition in the same group of animals with a
different three-step ‘‘covert pattern’’ (‘‘RRL’’ instead of ‘‘LLR’’),
normal learning was observed (16.26% ± 1.25%, 21.05% ±
1.01% in sessions 2 and 3 for rM3D competitor 2 group in the
presence of vehicle versus 20.33% ± 1.40%, 23.75% ± 1.30%
for WT competitor 2 group, not significant, Wilcoxon rank sum;
Figure S4A). Increased release from LC terminals in ACC thus
appears to prevent animals from using their experience to infer
or model the environment’s governing rule and biasing their
behavioral choices accordingly.
If activation of LC input into ACC indeed promotes the aban-
donment of the experience-derived internal model in favor ofimposed behavioral variation, then suppressing it should restore
the ability of animals to learn from environmental feedback. Next,
we therefore examined whether animals whose modeling at-
tempts had been thwarted by the sophistication of competitor
3 would regain their ability to discover the ‘‘covert pattern’’
efficiently if noradrenergic input into ACC was suppressed. To
silence LC input into the ACC, we relied on a different DREADD
receptor, hM4D, which couples to the Gi-GIRK pathway, thereby
causing membrane hyperpolarization that inhibits action poten-
tial-triggered neurotransmitter release (Armbruster et al., 2007).
Local administration of CNO into the ACC of hM4D -expressing
animals that were operating in a feedback- and model-indepen-
dent mode because of prior exposure to Competitor 3 lead to
efficient learning in the ‘‘covert pattern’’ task (Figure 5C), with
reward rates that were indistinguishable from those seen in ani-
mals that had faced competitor 2 rather than competitor 3 and
had therefore retained sensitivity to environmental feedback
(Figure 5C; reward rates for hM4D competitor 3 group in the
presence of CNO: 18.83% ± 1.16%, 22.18% ± 0.33% for ses-
sions 2 and 3, not significant from reward rates for WT Compet-
itor 2 group: 20.33% ± 1.40%, 23.75% ± 1.30%, Wilcoxon rank
sum). Thus, suppressing the action of the noradrenergic system
in ACC appears to fully restore an animal’s ability to learn from
the environmental feedback.
Is the behavioral rescue selective for local noradrenergic
action in ACC? The opposite behavioral consequence of ACC
CNO administration in rM3D- versus hM4D-expressing animals
(Figure 5C) strongly suggests that perturbation of the noradren-
ergic input rather than a nonspecific effect of the compound itself
accounts for the observations. Furthermore, in line with what we
observed for the wild-type animals after competitor 3 exposure,
little learning over the course of three sessions was observed in
the control group of hM4D-expressing animals that also previ-
ously faced competitor 3 but received either vehicle injection in
or CNO injection outside of the ACC (reward rates for the LC-
hM4D competitor 3 mixed control group: 11.86% ± 1.33%,Cell 159, 21–32, September 25, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 27
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Figure 6. Enhancement of LC Input into ACC Leads to More Variable Behavioral Output
(A) Left, top: experimental approach to optogenetic enhancement of LC input into ACC (schematic). Bottom: experimental schedule. Middle: mean reward rate.
Right: prevalence of LLR pattern, for an expert animal in the absence (light gray) and in the presence (dark gray) of ChR2-mediated enhancement of transmission
from LC terminals in ACC. The solid and dashed gray lines in the right panel indicate mean and 95% confidence interval for the prevalence of LLR pattern
expected for an unbiased stochastic process. n = 3 animals.
(B) Left: experimental approach to pharmacogenetic enhancement of LC input into ACC (schematic). Middle: mean reward rate. Right: mean K-L divergence of
the rats’ behavior, during play against competitor 2 under vehicle (light gray) and CNO (dark gray). n = 5 animals.
(C) Schematic of action selection. Behavioral choice on each trial is a single draw from a binomial distribution, where the probability of a left choice, p, is
determined by a weighted combination of the recommendation of the internal model and a bias for or against the left option. The contribution of the model to the
final choice is weighted by w, which decreases with increasing LC input into the ACC. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, Wilcoxon rank sum. Error bars represent the SEM.15.25% ± 1.85% for sessions 2 and 3, not significantly different
from reward rates in the WT competitor 3 group: 11.65% ±
1.37%, 14.51% ± 1.54%, Wilcoxon rank sum; Figure S4B).
Finally, learning from feedback was not rescued by hM4D-medi-
ated suppression of the input from the dopaminergic input from
the ventral tegmental area (VTA) into the ACC (Figure S5). Com-
bined, these control experiments argue for the selective role of
input from the locus coeruleus in switching behavioral modes.
The fact that the CNO-treated hM4D animals show normal
learning rates and achieve expert-level performance on a
task that requires ACC (Figure 3) suggests that suppressing
noradrenergic action in ACC restores model-based control
of behavior. To obtain further support for this notion, we
looked in greater detail at how the CNO-treated animals inferred
the ‘‘left-left-right’’ rule. We specifically looked for a signature
of hypothesis testing—an inference strategy whereby various
discrete possible rules are tested until one is found that is consis-
tent with the data. One of the most notable signs of hypothesis
testing is the existence of abrupt change points in the learning
curve where the frequency of the correct action pattern acceler-
ates abruptly and, in particular, increases discontinuously during
learning (Gallistel et al., 2004). Abrupt increases in the preva-
lence of single and concatenated ‘‘LLR’’ patterns were, in fact,
seen for most animals in the group (Figures 5D and S6), suggest-
ing that suppression of noradrenergic action in ACC restored not
only the ability to learn from environmental feedback but also
model-based control of behavior.28 Cell 159, 21–32, September 25, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.LC Input into ACC Triggers Behavioral Variation
Is the role of noradrenergic action in ACC limited to controlling
learning in response to a sudden change in the environment
as in the case of a switch to the ‘‘covert pattern’’ task? To
address this question, we determined whether the influence of
an animal’s established model of the environment on behavioral
choices can be suppressed by stimulating transmission from the
LC terminals in the ACC.
We first assessed whether triggering release from LC termi-
nals affects stable ‘‘expert’’ level of performance on the ‘‘covert
pattern’’ task. We divided each behavioral session into two
blocks of 250 trials during which LC input was either left
unperturbed or enhanced through optical stimulation of ChR2-
expressing terminals (Figure 6A). Illuminating ACC—which
presumably caused the ChR2-mediated depolarization of and
thus neurotransmitter release from LC terminals—led to a signif-
icant impairment in performance (with reward rate dropping from
25.27 ± 1.09 to 18.93 ± 1.02%, p < 0.04, Wilcoxon signed rank,
two-tailed) which was caused by a drop in the prevalence of the
‘‘left-left-right’’ sequence (from 21.07% ± 1.09% in the absence
to 16.27% ± 1.06% in the presence of stimulation, p < 0.04,
Wilcoxon signed rank, two tailed; Figure 6A). Stimulating LC
input into the ACC thus leads the animals to partially abandon
a previously established behavioral model.
Finally, we determined whether enhancing LC input into
the ACC prevents animals from using a counterpredictive
strategy and makes them behave more randomly. Indeed,
rM3-DREADD-mediated enhancement of release from LC ter-
minals in ACC during play against competitor 2 led to a signifi-
cant a change in performance and in behavioral variability as
did ACC inactivation (Figure 6B; c.f. Figure 4C; reward
rate increasing from 41.42% ± 1.36% to 48.3% ± 1.39%, p <
0.01 and K-L-divergence dropping from 0.1055 ± 0.0162 to
0.0617 ± 0.0132, p < 0.04, Wilcoxon signed rank, two tailed).
Combined, these results argue that the input from the locus co-
eruleus into the ACC controls the amount of imposed behavioral
variation, whether or not learning is warranted by an environ-
mental change.
DISCUSSION
The neural mechanisms responsible for variability in behavior
are poorly understood. Prevailing views hold that in complex
settings animals base their choice of actions on an inferred in-
ternal model of the environment’s governing rules (Courville
et al., 2006; Green et al., 2010; Nassar et al., 2010), with any
behavioral variability attributed to noise (Faisal et al., 2008;
Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Padoa-Schioppa, 2013) or errors in
the inference of such rules (Beck et al., 2012). Here, we pro-
vide evidence that the brain possesses a mechanism for
imposed behavioral variation and demonstrate that LC-medi-
ated gating of neural activity in the ACC—the presumed locus
of the animal’s beliefs about the causal structure of its environ-
ment (Holroyd and Yeung, 2012; Karlsson et al., 2012; Matsu-
moto et al., 2003; Nassar et al., 2012; Ribas-Fernandes et al.,
2011)—determines whether behavior is based on an experi-
ence-derived internal model or is varied independently of prior
experience.
The highly variable choice selections made in the behavioral
mode exposed by our strong competitor were dramatically
less sensitive to environmental feedback. By generating such
a high degree of behavioral variability while eliminating any
simple relation to past experience, animals in this behavioral
mode exhibit essentially stochastic action selection. It is un-
clear whether the failure to reach the reward rate of 50% ex-
pected from an unbiased stochastic process (mean reward
rate against competitor 3 was 48%, different from 50%,
p<0.001, one sample t test, Figure 4C; data not shown) in
this effectively stochastic mode is due to a small bias in an
otherwise random process or derives from imperfections in
the neural implementation of a pseudorandom generator.
Regardless of whether this behavioral mode relies on a truly
random process (which cannot be proven experimentally) or
merely approximates it, the resulting choices would appropri-
ately be captured by a stochastic exploration term in behav-
ioral models.
What is the neural substrate of the behavioral variability
observed when animals abandon the internal model in favor of
this effectively stochastic choice? In principle, a switch in activity
in the ACC itself could be the source of behavioral variability
(Hayden et al., 2011). Alternatively, a circuit outside the ACC
may actively introduce variability into a downstream decision cir-
cuit, in a manner analogous to the role imputed for the LMAN nu-
cleus in song learning in the zebra finch (Fee andGoldberg, 2011;
Kao et al., 2005). Finally, stochasticity could emerge in the deci-sion circuit itself. Our finding that behavior in the stochastic
mode is insensitive to the suppression of ACC activity suggests
that variability is largely generated outside of the ACC and thus
argues against the first scenario but is consistent with both the
second and third scenarios. Removal of ACC input could
magnify the effect of the external locus of variability or alterna-
tively, in the absence of strong ACC input, a ‘‘winner-take-all’’
structure of decision circuitry could amplify small, internal
noise-driven differences to generate choice variability (Wang,
2002).
Our analysis has focused on behavioral variability in an
extreme scenario in which stochasticity could be uniquely ad-
vantageous. This, however, begs the question of how the tran-
sition to variable behavior occurs in more typical settings for
which full stochasticity is not needed. Intuitively, the exploitation
of knowledge accumulated through internal modeling needs to
be counterbalanced by exploration designed to improve the
model’s accuracy and test its current validity (Cohen et al.,
2007; Sutton and Barto, 1998). The degree of behavioral vari-
ability may thus need to be modulated according to subjects’
uncertainty about their internal model of the environment. Our
findings that model-based control of behavior is abandoned
when LC input into the ACC is enhanced, but can be restored
in the stochastic regime by lowering it, argues that the extent
to which choices are informed by the internal model is depen-
dent on modulation by the noradrenergic system (Figure 6C).
In this context, recent observations from studies measuring pu-
pillary responses in humans—a known consequence of LC acti-
vation—suggest that levels of noradrenergic signaling reflect
the degree of uncertainty about the accuracy of one’s internal
model, with high levels associated with the discarding of an un-
reliable model (Nassar et al., 2012) and low levels linked to sta-
bilization of an accurate model (O’Reilly et al., 2013). Because
uncertainty about model reliability has been shown to translate
into instability of ACC ensemble activity (Karlsson et al., 2012),
LC input into the ACC may modulate—via norepinephrine itself
or via other substances thought to be co-released by the
noradrenergic fibers (Devoto et al., 2001; Xu et al., 1998)—
the strength and/or coherence of ACC output. Modulating the
effectiveness of ACC output in driving the downstream decision
circuit could therefore translate the degree of the model accu-
racy into an appropriate balance between exploitation and
exploration.
We note that complete abandonment of an internal model and
adoption of a fully stochastic behavioral mode is normally mal-
adaptive because of the associated insensitivity to new informa-
tion. In rats, such amode appears to be triggered when repeated
modeling efforts prove to be ineffective and thus bears a similar-
ity to the condition of learned helplessness thought to follow the
sustained experience of the futility of one’s actions. Intriguingly,
functional imaging studies in humans have suggested that a
chronic reduction in ACC activity might play a role in this disorder
(Bauer et al., 2003), providing a potential mechanistic counter-
part to the disengagement of ACC from the decision-making
process that accompanies the switch into an effectively stochas-
tic behavioral mode in rodents. The fact that the ability to discern
environmental rules can be restored by suppressing the
action of the noradrenergic system in ACC could pave a pathCell 159, 21–32, September 25, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 29
to a better understanding of and intervention in states of learned
helplessness.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Male Long Evans rats (300–450 g) were kept at 85% of their initial body weight
before food restriction by providing them with 4–5 g food pellets a day. Exper-
iments were conducted in accordance with the NIH guidelines for animal
research andwere approved by the Institutional Animal Care andUseCommit-
tee at Howard Hughes Medical Institute’s Janelia Farm Research Campus.
Task Design
The virtual competitive settingwas inspiredbyprimatework (Barraclough et al.,
2004; Lee et al., 2004). Thecomputerwasprogrammed topredictwhich reward
port the animal would choose on the current trial. The prediction was made by
using the history of the animal’s performance up to that trial in the session.
ComputerCompetitor30 Cell 159, 21–Prediction AlgorithmCompetitor 1 binomial test; reacts to large bias, similar to
algorithm 2 in references (Barraclough et al., 2004;
Lee et al., 2004)Competitor 2 binomial test; reacts to any biasCompetitor 3 boosting with diverse features (Friedman et al., 2000)For the ‘‘covert pattern’’ inference task, the computer rewarded every
instance of a three-step ‘‘covert pattern,’’ usually the ‘‘left-left-right’’
sequence. In addition, the animal was rewarded with 10% probability when
it escaped prediction by competitor 2, which was running in parallel.
Simulated Play
During simulatedplay, the prediction algorithmusedby aparticular competitor,
rather than playing against an animal, uses existing behavioral data from an in-
dividual animal having faced adifferent competitor. Data up to trial n are used to
make a prediction of the animal’s behavior at trial n+1. The simulated reward is
determined using the same rules that govern real play; i.e., simulated reward
accrued if the animal’s behavior disagreed with the prediction.
Variability Metrics
Divergence from the Optimal Deterministic Strategy
Competitors 1 and 2 use conditional prevalences of the left and right choices
given a particular history pattern of up to three steps in the past to inform their
prediction. This implies that the optimal deterministic strategy is to keep track
of every pattern up to that length and ensure that the conditional prevalence of
going left or right is 0.5.
We quantified how different the observed behavior was from this optimal
strategy by calculating the Kullback-Leibler divergence (DKL) of the observed
distribution of conditional prevalences given all patterns of lengths n = 1, 2,
and 3 from the optimal one.
For each history pattern of choices and reward,
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where the last term corrects for the limited sample size. df stands for degrees
of freedom, and in this case
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General Measure of Variability in the Observed Sequence of Choices
The degree of randomness in the sequences of animals’ choices was charac-
terized using Shannon entropy.
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Multiple Linear Regression
The relationship between the past three trials and the rats’ choices was exam-
ined by performing the following regression analysis:
Ct =a+
X3
n= 1
bnCtn +
X3
m= 1
b3+mRtn;
where Ct is choice (1 and 1 for left and right, respectively) on trial t, and Rt is
reward (1 for rewarded, 1 for rewarded) on trial t. First-session data from
each competitor group was used for the analysis, and the distribution of R2
values across all of the rats was reported for each competitor.
Reinforcement Learning Model
Each Q-learner was parameterized by a learning rate, a, and a discount rate, g,
as specified by Equation 1:
Qt +1ðst ; atÞ)Qtðst ; atÞ+a

Rt +gmax
at +1
ðQtðst + 1; at +1ÞÞ Qtðst ; atÞ

;
(Equation 1)
where s is the state of the environment, a is the action, and R is the reward
received.
The action that maximizes the sum of the estimated Q-value for potential
future states and weighted exploration bonus, as specified by Equation 2,
was chosen deterministically. The exploration bonus was calculated using
the square root of the number of trials since the potential state occurred, r,
weighted by a variable parameter, brec.
Eval =Qtðst + 1; aÞ+ brec
ﬃﬃﬃ
r
p
(Equation 2)
Q-learners performed 1,000 trials against competitor 3, followed by 3,000 trials
on the ‘‘covert pattern’’ task. For each memory length N (N = 1 to 6 for different
Q-learners) and each tuple of the parameters a, g, brec (varied between 0 and 1
in increments of 0.1), twenty simulations were run, and the performance was
averaged. The performance against competitor 3 was summarized as the
reward rate for the last 700 trials. Q-learners that achieved the reward rate
of at least 40% against competitor 3 were used in simulations for the ‘‘covert
pattern’’ task.
Markov Chain Analysis
The effect of the past choice patterns on the probability of the subsequent
response was estimated by measuring how well a Markov chain of order
n (for n = 1 to 5) fits the data.
a
2 =
X ðfobs  festÞ2
s2
;
where fobs is the observed frequency for a given pattern of length n, fest is the
estimated frequency for the given pattern of length n based upon the observed
frequencies of patterns of length n-1, and s2 is the variance of pattern fre-
quencies across sessions.
Change Point Analysis
A cumulative sums bootstrap scheme (Hinkley, 1971) was used to detect the
presence of a change point in the prevalence of a pattern of choices within a
session during the ‘‘covert pattern’’ task. For each trial, we computed St, the
cumulative sum of the difference from the mean prevalence, qt, of a particular
choice pattern h:
S0 = 0; St
Xt
j =1

h qt
	
95%confidence intervals were estimated by computingSt for shuffled time se-
ries of the occurrence of h within the session. The presence of a significant
change point was indicated by the deviation of the cumulative difference
from the mean prevalence beyond these confidence intervals.
Perturbation Experiments
Muscimol (Tocris Bioscience; 0.50 ml of 0.1 mg/ml solution) or CNO (Enzo Life
Sciences; 0.50 ml of 3 mM solution) was infused through a bilateral cannula
that had been surgically implanted above the targeted brain region. All injec-
tions were done in awake animals, making it possible for the behavioral assay
to resume immediately after injection.
Channelrhodposin Perturbation Experiments
On stimulation trials, a 1 s 10 Hz train of 50 ms pulses of 5 mW 473 nm
light (Stratus 473-80, Vortran Technologies) was delivered, triggered by the
detection of an initiation port entry, bilaterally through a fiber optic cannula.
Histology
To locate the tip of the injection needle, fluorescent beads or GFP-expressing
adenoassociated virus were injected at the end of the final experimental
session. Several days later, animals were euthanized, and brains were fixed
with 4% paraformaldehyde and sectioned (50 mm coronal sections).
For further details about the Experimental Procedures, please refer to the
Extended Experimental Procedures.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Extended Experimental Procedures and
six figures and can be found with this article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1016/j.cell.2014.08.037.
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